Procedure & Regularity for Accuracy, True Dispute Resolution and Happiness

A Comparative Psychological–Legal Analysis of the Grounds for Cognitive Biases in Default Arbitration and the Mechanisms for Preserving Arbitrator Impartiality

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 Associate Professor of Private & Islamic Law, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

2 PhD Candidate of Oil and Gas Law, Faculty of Law, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran

3 M.A, Faculty of Psychology, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

Abstract
Default arbitration, due to the non-appearance of the respondent and the absence of their defenses, constitutes a context susceptible to cognitive biases affecting arbitrators. This vulnerability exists across all types of arbitration, including commercial and domestic and international investment arbitration, potentially compromising the arbitrator’s impartiality. The present study aims to identify the circumstances in which cognitive biases emerge in default arbitration and to propose effective legal mechanisms to safeguard arbitrator impartiality. Employing a qualitative, analytical-comparative methodology, the research integrates principles of cognitive psychology—specifically the “fast and slow thinking” theory—and arbitration law, based on library-based analysis. Ten distinct cognitive biases were identified, each capable of influencing both procedural and substantive rulings in the absence of the respondent. The redesign of procedural requirements, engagement of independent experts, and establishment of multi-member arbitral tribunals, as opposed to sole arbitrators, can mitigate these biases and reinforce arbitrator impartiality. Properly structured procedural safeguards not only control cognitive biases but also enhance the legitimacy and enforceability of arbitral awards.



Keywords: default arbitration, arbitral award, cognitive bias, confirmation bias, effective notification

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Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript
Available Online from 12 December 2025

  • Receive Date 19 October 2025
  • Accept Date 12 December 2025
  • Publish Date 12 December 2025